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The Abstruse Science: Kelo, Lochner, and




The Fifth Amendment provides that the government may use
its eminent domain power to take property only if that property
will be put to a "public use." This article examines the controver-
sial 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, in which the Su-
preme Court held that a private economic development project
could constitute such a "public use." I argue that the Kelo Court,
while superficially appearing to do no more than reiterate well-
established precedent requiring deference to the decisions of gov-
ernment actors on the public use question, actually suggested a
new test for some kinds of takings. At least with respect to eco-
nomic development projects, the Court indicated that it might look
for the existence of a comprehensive development plan as strong
evidence that a taking of property was truly for a public use and
not for the impermissible end of favoring private interests. I ar-
gue that by establishing a test that inquires into the process by
which takings decisions are made, the Court has adopted a repre-
sentation reinforcement model of constitutional decision-making.
Under the representation reinforcement model, a Court that is
unable or unwilling to promulgate a precise rule for resolution of a
constitutional question instead relegates the decision to the politi-
cal process, but then scrutinizes the process to make sure that it
operates fairly.
I further argue that Kelo provides an excellent occasion for ex-
amining the connection between modern public use jurisprudence
and that of the Lochner era. During the Lochner era, according to
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conventional wisdom, the Justices substituted their own economic
and political philosophies for legitimate constitutional doctrine in
order to invalidate laws they disliked. I agree with the common
sentiment that the Court's modern reluctance to second-guess
governmental public use questions is a reaction to the perceived
"judicial activism" of the Lochner era. But I argue that, ironically,
modern public use doctrine produces results that are essentially
indistinguishable from those of the Lochner era. Finally, I argue
that the rule of Kelo is likely to have little impact on the use of
eminent domain for economic development projects, nor will it
provide much protection against abuse of the taking power.
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Whatever happened to the "purely-private taking,"' and would
we know one if we saw it? It has long been a truism of American
eminent domain 2 law that the Fifth Amendment prevents the gov-
ernment from taking property for anything but a "public use." 3 As
the courts have often stated, a "purely private taking"-that is a
"taking from A to give to B" with no associated public benefit-is
forbidden as beyond the legitimate power of government. Yet un-
der the modern cases, courts generally exercise extreme deference
to government assertions that a proposed use of property it in-
tends to condemn is "public." In fact, anything that government
officials could conceivably believe might bestow a public benefit or
advantage is considered to be a "public use" for Fifth Amendment
purposes,4 even if private interests are also benefited. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's most recent public statement on the meaning of
the public use requirement, expressed in the controversial 2005
decision in Kelo v. City of New London,5 suggests, at least superfi-
cially, that it is almost impossible for an exercise of eminent do-
main to be considered purely private. In Kelo, the Court held that
the indirect economic benefits expected from a private redevelop-
ment project could constitute a public use, thus allowing the gov-
ernment to use its eminent domain power to assemble land for the
project. This was true even though numerous private interests
might also benefit. Since the government could conceivably be-
lieve that any transfer of private property from one person to an-
other could bestow some public advantage, it follows that, at least
1. The term "purely private taking" appears in Thompson v. Consol. Gas Util. Corp.,
300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937), and has been used repeatedly in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Throughout this article I will use it to refer, as the Court has, to a taking from one party
followed by a transfer to another private party without a resulting public benefit or advan-
tage. Such takings are thought to improperly favor private interests and not the public.
2. "Eminent domain ... is the legal right to acquire property by forced rather than
voluntary exchange." Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J.
POL. ECON. 473, 473 (1978).
3. The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part: "[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST., amend. V.
4. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) ("[Wlhere the exer-
cise of eminent domain is rationally related to any conceivable public purpose, the Court
has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.") See also
Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for
Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 513 (2006) (dis-
cussing judicial deference where eminent domain power advances any conceivable public
purpose); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 452-53
(2007) (describing "conceivability test").
5. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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as far as legal definitions go, there can be no such thing as a
"purely-private" taking.
Although much scholarly commentary has asserted that the
Kelo decision did nothing to limit the circumstances in which
property can be said to be for a "public use," I argue otherwise.
Significantly, the Court suggested a change in the modern doc-
trine requiring near complete judicial deference to the govern-
ment's decisions regarding what constitutes a public use. Under
the approach suggested in Kelo, the existence of a credible plan-
ning process may be a significant factor in determining whether a
planned project satisfies the public use requirement. If I am cor-
rect, then the court has shifted from an "ends" test (considering
what ultimate ends would be served by the project) to a process-
based approach designed to flush out uses of the eminent domain
power motivated by an improper desire to benefit private inter-
ests.
In adding this nuance to public use jurisprudence, the Kelo
Court signaled that, at least within this one area of substantive
law, it had moved toward the school of constitutional interpreta-
tion known as "representation reinforcement." 6 The representa-
tion reinforcement model holds that where the text of the Consti-
tution is vague or silent, constitutional decision-making should be
left to the political process, subject only to judicial review for signs
of process failure, including the failure of groups to be adequately
represented and private interest group "capture." The Kelo major-
ity, and particularly a separate concurrence by Justice Kennedy,
suggested that the existence of a comprehensive development
plan, presumably created with the input of numerous affected
groups and governed by local planning law, would be a significant
factor in drawing the line between public and private takings.
In addition to arguing that Kelo signified a practical and theo-
retical shift in the Court's approach to interpreting the public use
clause, I further contend that the case provides an excellent start-
ing point for an important and overlooked inquiry into the impact
of the so-called Lochner7 era on modern public use law. The
Lochner era, of course, refers to a period spanning from roughly
6. Paul Boudreaux has previously applied representation reinforcement theory to the
public use question, proposing that public use law consider disparate impact on "suspect
classes." See Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of Rep-
resentation Reinforcement, 83 DENY. U. L. REV. 1, 6, 49-50. (2005); see generally JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-104 (1980).
7. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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the 1870s through the late 1930s,8 when the Supreme Court em-
ployed a now-discredited interpretation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a significant number
of government economic and public welfare regulations. 9 Many
critics contend that the era was dominated by intrusive and un-
democratic judicial activism by justices determined to impose their
laissez faire economic philosophy on the country. 10
The rhetoric of Kelo and other modern public use cases suggest
that the Court, as in other areas of constitutional law, is deter-
mined to avoid the excesses of the Lochner era by refusing to sub-
stitute its own judgment for that of the democratic branches of
government on the "public use" question. 11 I argue, however, that
while the Court's modern approach to the public use question does
not in any way resemble the "activism" with which the Lochner
Court is sometimes associated, modern doctrine has, nonetheless,
produced essentially the same results as were typical of the
Lochner era. I further argue that this is partly because today's
public use law shares some of the underlying principles of
Lochner-era jurisprudence, and partly because it rejects others.
My analysis offers what I believe are significant insights into the
often unexpected and seemingly irreconcilable consequences of
changes in theories of constitutional review that occur as a result
of changes in society at large.
Finally, I contend that the Supreme Court's shift toward a
model of representation reinforcement in adjudicating public use
cases is likely to inadequately enforce the public use clause, with
the result that one of the key purposes of the public use require-
ment-that of preventing political elites from capturing the politi-
cal process and employing it to essentially appropriate some of the
wealth of those property owners who are disadvantaged in the po-
litical process-may not be realized.
In Part I of this article, I describe and analyze the three signifi-
cant modern public use cases, demonstrating their broad defer-
ence to legislative decision-making and explaining the new test
8. The Lochner era is commonly described as having ended with the decision in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage law and abrogat-
ing Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of
Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV.
605, 610 n.16 (1996); See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
873, 876 (1987).
9. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 607, Sunstein, supra note 8, at 874.
10. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 611.
11. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 874.
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suggested in Kelo. In Part II, I discuss the jurisprudence of the
Lochner era as it relates to both general economic regulation and
the public use clause. In Part III, I discuss the justifications for
the eminent domain power and the justice and efficiency concerns
that attend overuse of the power. In Part IV, I discuss the theo-
ries of constitutional decision-making applicable to modern public
use doctrine and discuss how the Kelo decision marks a shift to-
ward greater emphasis on a representation reinforcement model.
In Part V, I analyze several state court public use decisions that
employ a process-based analysis similar to that suggested by Kelo.
I also discuss the strengths and weakness of the new Kelo rule. In
Part VI, I conclude that while the process-based approach set forth
in Kelo is a minor improvement over previous law, it is unlikely to
significantly limit the use of eminent domain for economic devel-
opment or otherwise reduce eminent domain abuse.
I. THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY PRECEDENTS-AND KELO
A. Broad Deference to Political Decisions
In this section, I briefly discuss the three significant modern
public use cases: Berman v. Parker, 12 Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff,13 and Kelo v. City of New London.14 All of these cases
represent stark examples of the Supreme Court's near-complete
deference to governmental decisions as to what constitutes a "pub-
lic use." A nagging concern underlying all three cases is that the
degree of deference demonstrated by the Court results in a virtual
repeal of the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement. Kelo,
however, suggests a slight shift by hinting that concerns regarding
abuse of eminent domain and improper favoritism of private in-
terests may be addressed by examining whether the government
is acting pursuant to a comprehensive plan.
1. Berman v. Parker
In Berman, the owners of a department store challenged the
District of Columbia's attempt to use the power of eminent domain
to take their property in furtherance of an urban redevelopment
plan to be implemented in a blighted neighborhood. 15 The plan
12. 348 U.S. 28 (1954).
13. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
14. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
15. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32, 30.
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contemplated that some condemned property would be transferred
to private entities. 16 The property owners raised two arguments
that are significant for my purposes. First, they complained that
the intended transfer to private interests rendered the taking
"private."17 Second, they complained that because their particular
property was not blighted, the government should be prevented
from taking it. 18
The Court unanimously upheld the taking. 19 Justice Douglas
addressed the claim that the taking was not for a "public purpose"
by explaining:
We deal . . .with what has traditionally been known as the
police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer
limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts.
The definition is essentially the project of legislative determi-
nations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes
neither abstractly not historically capable of complete defini-
tion. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been deter-
mined in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases, the legis-
lature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of public needs
to be served by social legislation.20
He explained that the Court would not second-guess the city's
assertion that the property would be put to a public use, because
"[t]he role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is
being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one."
21
Economic development clearly provided a public benefit and,
therefore, it was of little consequence that private entities would
ultimately hold an interest in the taken property. He explained
that "the means of executing the project are for Congress and
Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been
established."22 Moreover, the department store owners' conten-
tion that their own property should be spared because it was not
16. Id.
17. Id. at 31.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 36.
20. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. See also Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 70 (1986-87) (explaining: "Police power,' is here synonymous with the
extent to which government may constitutionally regulate private activity. It defines those
issues with which the government may concern itself.").
21. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
22 Id. at 33.
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blighted was unavailing because "[o]nce the question of public
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of the land to
be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to com-
plete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative
branch."
23
2. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
Thirty years later, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,24 a
unanimous Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a land redistri-
bution scheme in Hawaii. Long-entrenched land-holding patterns
had left most of the state's privately-owned land in the hands of 72
owners. 25 The state planned to take much of the land and sell it
in fee to the tenants then in possession.26 The landowners con-
tended that because private interests would be the ultimate trans-
ferees, the takings were not for a public use. 27
Relying on Berman, the Court reiterated its long-held view that
condemnation could be employed to advance any legitimate gov-
ernmental goal.28 Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous
court, declared: "The public use requirement is coterminous with
the scope of a sovereign's police powers."29 Since "regulating oli-
gopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a
State's police powers," the land reform plan constituted a public
use.30 The Court emphasized its historic disapproval of "purely
private takings." "31 But, it continued, "where the exercise of emi-
nent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be pro-
scribed by the Public Use Clause."32 Referring implicitly to insti-
tutional legitimacy concerns, the Court explained that, "[jiudicial
deference is required because, in our system of government, legis-
latures are better able to assess what public purposes should be
advanced by an exercise of eminent domain." 33 Referring implic-
itly to institutional competency concerns, the Court stated that
23. Id. at 35-36.
24. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229.
25. Id. at 232.
26. See id. at 232-34.
27. See id. at 234-35.
28. See id. at 239-40.
29. Midkiff, 467 U.S.at 240.
30. Id. at 241-42.
31. Id. at 245.
32. Id. at 241.
33. See id. at 244.
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"whether in fact the provision will accomplish its objectives is not
the question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if... the
... [state] Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act]
would promote its objective." 34 Noting its previous reliance on Old
Dominion Co. v. United States,35 the Court explained that defer-
ence to governmental public use determinations was required "un-
til it is shown to involve an impossibility. '36 While courts did have
a narrow role in reviewing government's decision to use the emi-
nent domain power, 37 the Court declared: "[w]hen the legislature's
purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases
make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no
less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic
legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal courts."38
3. Kelo v. City of New London
In Kelo v. City of New London, property owners sued to block
the use of the eminent domain power to take their homes in order
to construct a mixed-use economic development project.3 9 They
argued that the United States Constitution prohibited the exercise
of eminent domain power to allow for economic development by
private interests. 40 They requested a "clear, bright-line rule that
the trickle-down benefits of successful business do not make pri-
vate business a public use."41 In the alternative, they argued that
even if economic development satisfied the public use test, the
planned condemnations should be prevented absent "a reasonable
certainty that the condemnations w[ould] result in [the claimed]
public benefits." 42 Because the benefits-and even some key de-
tails-of the proposed project were uncertain, they contended that
the Court should prohibit the use of eminent domain to advance
the city's plan. 43 Failing to put a stop to the proposed condemna-
tions would leave nothing to "stop a city from transferring citizen
34. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added; alteration in original) (quoting W. & S.
Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981)).
35. 269 U.S. 55 (1925).
36. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240 (quoting Old Dominion Co., 269 U.S. at 66).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 247-48.





43. Id. at 38.
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A's property to citizen B for the sole reason that citizen B will put
the property to a more productive use and thus pay more taxes."
44
A sharply-divided Court upheld the Connecticut Supreme
Court's decision 45 rejecting the property owners' arguments.
46
Most of Justice Stevens' majority opinion was typical of previous
Supreme Court public use cases. Promoting economic develop-
ment, according to the Court, was no different from other govern-
mental goals previously upheld as public uses. 47 But without ex-
plicitly saying so, the majority opinion hinted that the proposed
condemnations at issue withstood charges that they were purely
private takings in large part because they would be "executed pur-
suant to a 'carefully considered' development plan."
48
The Court reiterated the proposition that "the City would no
doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners' land for the purpose of
conferring a private benefit on a particular party."49 It empha-
sized that condemnation could not be predicated on a pretextual
public use. In this case,though, the development plan was "care-
fully considered," and showed no evidence of a pretexual motiva-
tion.50 In addition to suggesting that the existence of a "carefully
considered" plan supported a conclusion that a taking was for a
public use, the majority further stated that "a one-to-one transfer
of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated devel-
opment plan would certainly raise a suspicion that a private pur-
pose was afoot."5 1 Such a transfer, however, was not before the
Court and could be evaluated if it were to occur. 52
Justice Kennedy joined the 5-4 majority opinion. But he wrote a
separate concurring opinion as well, setting forth his own views on
how the courts should approach alleged private takings. He de-
clared that "meaningful rational basis review . . . is required un-
der the Public Use Clause"53and that "transfers intended to con-
fer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only
incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Pub-
44. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 470-71.
45. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004).
46. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-88.
47. See id. at 477.
48. Id. (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004); see also
Garnett, supra note 4, at 447 (noting that planning may be "constitutionally significant").
49. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477 (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245).
50. Id. (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004)).
51. Id. at 487.
52. Id.
53. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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lic Use Clause."54 He called on courts to thoroughly scrutinize
plausible accusations of "impermissible favoritism." 55 He denied
that "review under Berman and Midkiff imposes no meaningful
judicial limits on the government's power to condemn any prop-
erty it likes."56 Rather, he continued,
a more stringent standard of review than that announced in
Berman and Midkiff might be appropriate for a more nar-
rowly drawn category of takings. There may be private trans-
fers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism
of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable
or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use
Clause.
57
But, he explained, the facts of the Kelo case did not raise concerns
of favoritism.5 8 This was primarily, he explained, because exten-
sive evidence suggested that the city had planned the project out
of a sincere desire to improve economic conditions and without any
particular private beneficiaries in mind. 9
B. A New Test
Prior to Kelo, the Court had never attempted to set forth a rule
for distinguishing a permissible taking and a "purely-private tak-
ing. Kelo, though, suggests that the process by which a decision to
take property is made may be a significant factor. The majority's
use of such terms as "carefully considered development plan,"
60
"integrated development plan,"61 and "comprehensive redevelop-
ment plan"62 implies that a taking will generally not be considered
"purely private" if undertaken pursuant to some degree of "com-
prehensive" planning. Conversely the absence of a comprehensive
plan may be considered "suspicious," thus, under circumstances
not defined by the Court, presumably triggering a departure from
the rational basis review typically employed in public use cases.
Such cases might lead to, in Justice Kennedy's words, "a more
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 492.
57. Id. at 493.
58. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59. See id. at 491-92.
60. Id. at 469 (majority opinion) (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500,
536 (Conn. 2004)).
61. Id. at 474.
62. Id. at 488.
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stringent standard of review," 63 perhaps even the adoption of a
"presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity. ' 64
II. THE STRANGE PATH FROM LOCHNER TO KELO
As already discussed, modern public use holdings have insisted
on strict deference to legislative decisions. In fact, judicial defer-
ence on the public use issue has led some to complain that the
public use clause is essentially dead.65 The Court's slavish devo-
tion to deference frequently is seen as desire to avoid the excesses
of the Lochner Court. In this section, I discuss the constitutional
jurisprudence of the Lochner era, both in the realms of economic
regulation and eminent domain law. I argue that the Court's
treatment of the public use requirement, unlike its treatment of
other economic issues, reflected a pronounced tendency to uphold
governmental action and to defer to political actors.
A. Lochner and Economic Regulation
Decisions of the Lochner Court were generally characterized by
a broad interpretation of the reach of the Due Process Clause, spe-
cifically its prohibition against deprivation of property without
due process of law. This expanded reach was accomplished by de-
fining "property," a term that in the past had generally been ap-
plied only to title in land, buildings, and personal property, to in-
clude a wide array of economic rights. 66 Eventually, "property"
became synonymous with "economic value,"67 and, as McUsic has
observed, "anything from a legal expectation to a 'product of the
mind,' if it could possess some market value, was property for con-
stitutional purposes."68 From this it followed that any economic
regulation which diminished value in the hands of a regulated
interest might violate the Due Process Clause. 69
There were key exceptions to the Lochner Court's prohibition
against regulations that would diminish the value of broadly con-
ceived property, but these exceptions were extremely limited. The
63. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 162 (1985) ("Scholarly commentators have rivaled each other in their efforts to
read the [public use] limitation out of the Constitution.").
66. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 607, 604.
67. Id. at 614.
68. Id. at 615.
69. See id. at 618.
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Court recognized only a very narrow category of legitimate gov-
ernmental objectives that might justify interfering with property
interests, primarily those designed to correct harms that were ei-
ther attributable to a regulated interest or objectionable at com-
mon law. 70 The government could, in keeping with common law,
regulate businesses that were "affected with a public interest."
Thus, in Munn v. Illinois71 the Court rejected a warehouseman's
challenge to a law setting maximum charges for grain storage be-
cause
[p]roperty does become clothed with a public interest when
used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect
the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in ef-
fect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must
submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to
the extent of the interest he has thus created. 72
Moreover, the government was free to regulate pursuant to its
police powers 73 the sovereign's inherent authority to protect the
public's safety, health and welfare.74 Thus, the government was
free to pass laws abating common law nuisances. 75 To ensure that
the government did not stray beyond its limited authority, the
Court employed rigorous means/ends analysis, testing whether
the law in question was truly health and welfare legislation.
76
The Court also applied what has been called a "cause/effect" test, 77
inquiring into whether the regulated interest had, in fact, caused
the harm that the challenged legislation was supposedly intended
70. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 877.
71. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
72. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126.
73. On the police power, see generally STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 217-58
(2d ed. 2001).
74. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 618-19.
75. See id. at 623. See also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665-66 (1887) (holding that
state's police power extended to regulating manufacture and sale of liquors and rejecting
brewery's due process claim on ground that "property in this country is held under the
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community").
76. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905) (rejecting law setting maxi-
mum work hours for bakery employees as "beyond the police power" because the Court saw
"no reasonable foundation for holding (the law] to be necessary or appropriate to safeguard
the public health, or the health of the individuals who are following the trade of a baker").
Accord McUsic, supra note 8, at 620.
77. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 620.
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to ameliorate. 78 Such scrutiny was intended to identify legislation
that, "while passed under what is claimed to be the police power
for the purpose of protecting the public health or welfare, [was], in
reality, passed from other motives."
79
B. Explanations for Lochner-Era Jurisprudence
There are two explanations for the jurisprudence of the Lochner
era that I consider particularly relevant here. Howard Gillman, in
The Constitution Besieged, rejects the view that the Lochner Court
acted out of a determination to impose the justices' personal lais-
sez faire economic views on the country. 80 He sums up the Court's
motivation as follows:
The object of the agenda was not to promote the value of mar-
ket liberty per se, nor to reduce government intervention in
the market to a bare minimum; rather, the goal was to pro-
hibit the government from passing laws designed merely to
promote the interests of certain classes at the expense of their
competitors, to impose special burdens and benefits on par-
ticular groups without linking those burdens and benefits to
the welfare of the community as a whole.
81
Cass Sunstein has argued that Lochner symbolizes "an ap-
proach that imposes a constitutional requirement of neutrality,
and understands the term to refer to preservation of the existing
distribution of wealth and entitlements under the baseline of
common law."8 2 This status quo was "natural" and "neutral," es-
sentially pre-political.8 3 Thus, redistributive government meas-
78. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 558 (1923) (striking down mini-
mum wage law in part because "the employer, by paying a fair equivalent for the service
rendered, though not sufficient to support the employee, has neither caused nor contributed
to her poverty"). Accord McUsic, supra note 8, at 621.
79. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61.
Statutes of the nature of that under review, limiting the hours in which grown
and intelligent men may labor to earn their living, are mere meddlesome inter-
ferences with the rights of the individual, and they are not saved from condem-
nation by the claim that they are passed in the exercise of the police power and
upon the subject of the health of the individual whose rights are interfered
with, unless there be some fair ground, reasonable in and of itself, to say that
there is material danger to the public health, or to the health of the employees,
if the hours of labor are not curtailed.
Id.
80. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 61 (1993).
81. Id.
82. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 875.
83. See id. at 879.
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ures, or regulations designed to afford certain individual protec-
tions, were prohibited. 4 According to Sunstein, such measures
"did not fall within the 'police power'; the employer had committed
no common law wrong, and regulatory power was largely limited
to redress harms recognized at common law. ' 85 To demonstrate
his concept of the neutral baseline from which, in the Lochnerian
view, government could not stray, Sunstein contrasts two signifi-
cant minimum wage cases. In Adkins v. Childrens Hospital,86 the
Court described a mandatory minimum wage as "a compulsory
exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent
person, for whose condition there rests upon him no peculiar re-
sponsibility, and therefore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoul-
ders a burden which, if it belongs to anybody, belongs to society as
a whole."
87
Fourteen years later, in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,88 a case
widely recognized as symbolizing the demise of the Lochner era,
89
the Court upheld a minimum wage law similar to that at issue in
Adkins, essentially inverting the economic assumptions underly-
ing the earlier case. In West Coast Hotel, the Court described
workers as "defenseless against denial of a living wage" and con-
stituting a "burden" to be born by the public. 90 The Court contin-
ued: '"What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called
upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met.... The commu-
nity is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for uncon-
scionable employers."91
Sunstein sees the two cases as reflecting opposing "baselines."
In Adkins, the baseline is the economic status quo. In the
Lochnerian view, property includes the right to be free from costs
imposed to alter this status quo, the "neutral" baseline. When an
employer must bear a cost to depart from this baseline, he is es-
sentially subsidizing the public, and a regulation requiring such
redistribution is essentially a "taking" of the employer's property.
This is only true, of course, if the regulated interest enjoyed "an
antecedent right to the property in question."92 Because Lochner
84. See id. at 877.
85. Id.
86. 261 U.S. 535 (1923).
87. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 557-58.
88. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
89. See McUsic, supra note 8, at 610 n.16; accord Sunstein, supra note 8, at 876.
90. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399.
91. Id.
92. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 882.
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and its progeny recognized a preexisting "right" to the value which
would be taken or diminished by a regulation, upsetting such a
right violated the economic "neutrality" required by the Due Proc-
ess Clause.
93
In West Coast Hotel, according to Sunstein, the baseline is a
state of distributive justice from which the employer, in the ab-
sence of wage regulation, departs.9 4 Now it is the public which
must "subsidize" the employer, whose conduct perpetuates what
the community may deem a departure from what should be the
appropriate state of affairs. The West Coast Hotel baseline rejects
the notion that the status quo is "neutral" or "natural," and there-
fore admits of the possibility that government is free to change
it. 95 Thus, West Coast Hotel embodies principals expressed in Jus-
tice Holmes' dissent in Lochner. There, Holmes wrote:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large
part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question
whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it
further and long before making up my mind. But I do not
conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that
my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the
right of a majority to embody their opinions in law .... The
14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics .... [A] Constitution is not intended to embody a par-
ticular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the or-
ganic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It
is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar,
or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judg-
ment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.96
Perhaps the most emphatic statement of post-Lochner judicial
approaches to government regulation can be found in the 1938
case of United States v. Carolene Products Co. 97 There, the Court
set forth a mode of analysis for economic legislation that is now
firmly-entrenched, declaring:
93. Id at 876, 882.
94. Id. at 876.
95. See generally id. at 881.
96. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
97. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to
be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitu-
tional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assump-
tion that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowl-
edge and experience of the legislators.
C. Lochner and "Public Use"
Modernly, some property rights activists have urged a return to
greater judicial scrutiny of economic regulation, which of course
includes the use of eminent domain to promote particular eco-
nomic interests. They urge a return to, or at least a reconsidera-
tion of, more robust due process property protections. Applying
Sunstein's rubric, they might be said to view stability of property
rights as a "neutral" value, bolstered by common law, to be dis-
turbed only with strong justifications.
Paradoxically, though, it is difficult to make the case that secu-
rity of possession was well-defended by the American common law
of eminent domain. It is not the case that a political or judicial
consensus consistently elevated possession of property over other
economic interests throughout much of our history.98 In the realm
of eminent domain law, the most commonly litigated issue con-
cerned whether condemned property, once taken, would be put to
a public use. The resolution of the issue, in theory, at least,
turned on the breadth of the meaning afforded the term "public
use." As has been widely-observed, the meaning of the term "pub-
lic use" is susceptible to two different definitions. 99 Under the so-
called "narrow view," a taking satisfies the public use requirement
only if after the taking, the public has the right to use the prop-
erty, or the property is owned by the government. Under the
"broad view," the public use requirement is met if the taking pro-
duces some public advantage or benefit. 100
Neither view could claim dominance among the many conflict-
ing state court decisions of the Nineteenth Century. 101 On the one
98. On the history of the public use requirement generally, see Cohen, supra note 4, at
500-516.
99. 2A JuLIus L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 7.02[2]-7.02[3] (3d ed.
2005) (discussing broad and narrow views).
100. See generally Cohen, supra note 4, at 493-94.
101. See id. at 504-08; see also Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Emi-
nent Domain, 57 OR. L. REv. 203, 209 (1978) (stating that "[t]he two doctrines competed,
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hand, adoption of the broad view allowed liberal use of the emi-
nent domain power to spur economic development. 10 2  On the
other hand, many courts grew concerned that widespread adoption
of the broad view threatened the security of property, 1 0 3 or that
private interests had co-opted state legislatures. 10 4 Thus, in the
mid-Nineteenth Century, the narrow view grew in prevalence. 10 5
But even where courts putatively adopted the narrow view, ac-
cording to Erroll Meidinger, many "developed elaborate methods
of evading its implications."'1 6 Ultimately, whether explicitly
stated or otherwise, the broad view came to dominate. 1
07
Even during the Lochner era, when the Court was reluctant to
permit political consensus to override economic rights, the U.S.
Supreme Court did not consistently apply either the broad or nar-
row view of public use. It is worth recalling that although the fed-
eral government's power to take property is governed by the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause, in actual practice most of the emi-
nent domain cases decided by the Court prior to the Twentieth
Century were decided under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. This was because until the late Nineteenth
Century, most eminent domain cases began in the state courts,
where state governments would condemn under their own initia-
tive or as proxies for the United States. 0 8 Because the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause was not incorporated against the
states until 1897,109 the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause provided the best federal constitutional basis on which to
leaving the commentators in hopeless confusion"); Errol E. Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of
Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 24 (1980) (stating that "two separate
positions, the 'broad' public benefit view and the 'narrow' use-by-the-public view, began to
grow up beside each other").
102. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POLY REV. 1, 9 (2003).
103. See Berger, supra note 101, at 208.
104. See Pritchett, supra note 102, at 10; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 260 (1977).
105. See Berger, supra note 101, at 208; Meidinger, supra note 101, at 24; Donald J.
Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 67 (1998); Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public
Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 617 (1940).
106. Meidinger, supra note 101, at 24. Accord Nichols, supra note 105, at 619 (arguing
that many courts adopted 'loopholes .... limitations .... and ... evasions... in order to
avoid bringing [the narrow] view into irreconcilable conflict with the expanding industrial-
ism of the times, and the quick exploitation of natural resources which was felt to be neces-
sary").
107. See Meidinger, supra note 101, at 28.
108. See Mark C. Landry, Note, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain-A
Requiem, 60 TUL. L. REV. 419, 423 & n.21 (1985).
109. See Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 228 (1897).
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challenge a condemnation. In the absence of a justifying public
use (however broadly defined), an act of condemnation would be
held to violate the Fourteenth, not the Fifth, Amendment.' 10
In that sense, eminent domain law might be thought to fit
neatly within the jurisprudence of economic regulation developed
by the Lochner Court under the Due Process Clause. One might
expect, then, to find a clear tendency toward restraint of the emi-
nent domain power, which, after all, could severely interfere with
property rights, among Lochner-era cases. But a close examina-
tion of these cases shows a marked tendency to uphold proposed
takings. A few patterns are clear. First, the Court was extremely
willing to accept a broad view of the term "public use." Second,
the justices evinced a marked tendency to defer to the judgments
of state courts regarding whether a taking was permissible. The
Court justified this deference based on a belief that local courts
were in a better position to judge the public needs of their own
states.
An example of the Court's willingness to stretch the term "pub-
lic use" to encompass what might be considered private takings is
the case of Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co."' That case
involved a challenge to the New Hampshire Mill Act. Like similar
acts that had at one time existed in virtually every state," 2 the
New Hampshire law limited the damages recoverable by an upper
riparian neighbor whose lands were flooded following construction
of a mill dam. 113 The Head Court noted that the common-law
remedy for such flooding might have included successive lawsuits
or removal of the dam. 1 4 Thus, prior to the mill acts, a manufac-
turer could not construct a mill dam without first obtaining con-
sent of his upriver neighbors. Under the acts, though, the remedy
was reduced to a single payment or annual damages assessed in a
single proceeding." 5 The effect of this statutory adjustment of
remedies, according to Lawrence Berger, was that the mill owner
obtained "the right to condemn the lands of his upper neighbor by
110. See, e.g., Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) (holding that "[t]he
taking by a state of the private property of one person or corporation, without the owner's
consent, for the private use of another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of the
fourteenth article of amendment of the constitution of the United States").
111. 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
112. Head, 113 U.S. at 16-20.
113. Id. at 12.




flooding." 116 The aggrieved property owner in Head claimed that
by enacting the law and thus enabling the owner of the mill to
flood his lands with minimal legal exposure, the state had taken
his land for a private use.li7 The Court, however, side-stepped the
public use issue, declining to see the controversy as involving the
eminent domain power at all. 118 Instead, the Court cast the case
as confronting what was essentially a land use regulation de-
signed to reconcile conflicting demands. The law, according to
Justice Gray, was
clearly valid as a just and reasonable exercise of the power of
the legislature, having regard to the public good, in a more
general sense, as well as to the rights of the riparian proprie-
tors, to regulate the use of the water-power of running
streams, which without some such regulation could not be
beneficially used. 119
Soon after deciding Head, the Court made one of its most em-
phatic statements regarding deference to the legislature. In
United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., 120 the Court up-
held a decision by the federal government to condemn land for
creation of a Civil War historical park.121 Justice Peckham first
asserted the general principle that the Court should defer to con-
gressional decisions regarding whether the property would be put
to a public use. He explained:
It is stated in the second volume of Judge Dillon's work on
Municipal Corporations (4th Ed. § 600) that, when the legisla-
ture has declared the use or purpose to be a public one, its
judgment will be respected by the courts, unless the use be
palpably without reasonable foundation. Many authorities are
cited in the note, and, indeed, the rule commends itself as a
rational and proper one. 
122
Indeed, Congress's authority in this area was so broad that, ac-
cording to the Court, it was not necessary to identify a particular
116. Berger, supra note 101, at 206.
117. See Head, 113 U.S. at 16.
118. Seeid. at 21.
119. Id. at 26.
120. 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
121. Gettysburg Elec., 160 U.S. at 682.
122. Id. at 680.
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Constitutional provision to justify the use of eminent domain. It
explained:
It is, of course, not necessary that the power of condemnation
for such purpose be expressly given by the constitution. The
right to condemn at all is not so given. It results from the
powers that are given, and it is implied because of its neces-
sity, or because it is appropriate in exercising those powers.
Congress has power to declare war, and to create and equip
armies and navies. It has the great power of taxation, to be
exercised for the common defense and general welfare. Hav-
ing such powers, it has such other and implied ones as are
necessary and appropriate for the purpose of carrying the
powers expressly given into effect. Any act of congress which
plainly and directly tends to enhance the respect and love of
the citizen for the institutions of his country, and to quicken
and strengthen his motives to defend them, and which is
germane to, and intimately connected with, and appropriate
to, the exercise of some one or all of the powers granted by
congress, must be valid. 123
Still, there were limits. In one of the few times the Court struck
down a taking as a public use occurred in 1896, with the decision
in Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska. 124 There, the court held
that a Nebraska order requiring a railroad to permit private indi-
viduals to build a grain elevator on its land was an unconstitu-
tional taking of private property for private use. 125 This decision,
however, was an anomaly.
In Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,126 plaintiff Bradley
challenged on Fourteenth Amendment Due Process grounds an
assessment levied against her property to fund an irrigation dis-
trict on the theory that the ditches that would be built by the dis-
trict would not be for a public use. 127 The Court noted that the
123. Id. at 681.
124. 164 U.S. 403 (1896). The Court incorporated the Fifth Amendment in its entirety
against the states in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 228
(1897).
125. Missouri Pac., 164 U.S. at 417.
126. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
127. Bradley, 164 U.S. at 154, 156. The plaintiff claimed, among other things,
[t]hat the use for which the water is to be procured is not in any sense a public
one, because it is limited to the landowners who may be such at the time when
the water is to be apportioned, and the interest of the public is nothing more
than that indirect and collateral benefit that it derives from every improve-
ment of a useful character that is made in the state.
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public use question had, "in substance, been answered in the af-
firmative by the people of California, and by the legislative and
judicial branches of the state government." 128 Nonetheless, the
Court went on to conduct its own independent analysis of whether
the irrigation district would, in fact, constitute a "public use." Af-
ter discussing various state constitutional provisions, state legis-
lation and state court rulings, Justice Peckham explained: "[w]e
do not assume that these various statements, constitutional and
legislative, together with the decisions of the state court, are con-
clusive and binding upon this court upon the question as to what
is due process of law, and, as incident thereto, what is a public
use."'129 Nonetheless, he noted that the Court would afford "great
respect" to the views of the "people and legislature and courts of
California." 130 He concluded: "[v]iewing the subject for ourselves,
and in the light of these considerations, we have very little diffi-
culty in coming to the same conclusion reached by the courts of
California." 131
A few years later, the Court again deferred to local decision-
making, but further elaborated upon its reasons for doing so. In
Clark v. Nash,132 a property owner challenged a law permitting a
neighbor to enlarge and use an irrigation ditch running over his
neighbor's property. The Court explained:
In some states, probably in most of them, the proposition con-
tended for by the plaintiffs in error would be sound. But
whether a statute of a state permitting condemnation by an
individual for the purpose of obtaining water for his land or
for mining should be held to be a condemnation for a public
use, and, therefore, a valid enactment, may depend upon a
number of considerations relating to the situation of the state
and its possibilities for land cultivation, or the successful
prosecution of its mining or other industries. Where the use
is asserted to be public, and the right of the individual to con-
demn land for the purpose of exercising such use is founded
upon or is the result of some peculiar condition of the soil or
climate, or other peculiarity of the state, where the right of
condemnation is asserted under a state statute, we are al-
Id. at 156.
128. Id. at 158-59.
129. Id. at 159.
130. Id. at 160.
131. Id.
132. 198 U.S. 361, 368 (1905).
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ways, where it can fairly be done, strongly inclined to hold
with the state courts, when they uphold a state statute pro-
viding for such condemnation. The validity of such statutes
may sometimes depend upon many different facts, the exis-
tence of which would make a public use, even by an individ-
ual, where, in the absence of such facts, the use would clearly
be private. Those facts must be general, notorious, and ac-
knowledged in the state, and the state courts may be assumed
to be exceptionally familiar with them. They are not the sub-
ject of judicial investigation as to their existence, but the local
courts know and appreciate them.
133
The next year, the Court applied similar deference to local offi-
cials' determinations regarding the particular needs of their juris-
diction in Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. 134 In Strick-
ley, the Court upheld a Utah statute under which a mining com-
pany had condemned an aerial right of way over the property of
another to run a bucket line. Again, the Court deferred to local
officials' judgment concerning what rules were necessary to ad-
vance a public use. It explained:
In the opinion of the legislature and the supreme court of
Utah the public welfare of that state demands that aerial
lines between the mines upon its mountain sides and the
railways in the valleys below should not be made impossible
by the refusal of a private owner to sell the right to cross his
land. The Constitution of the United States does not require
us to say that they are wrong. 1
35
Still, the Court, theoretically, at least, had not abandoned its
duty to make an independent determination of whether a public
use was served by a taking. In Hairston v. Danville and Western
Railway Co., 136 the Court again emphasized that the public use
question could depend a great deal on the particular circum-
stances prevailing in a jurisdiction. There, the Court declared
"the propriety of keeping in view by this court, while enforcing the
14th Amendment, the diversity of local conditions, and of regard-
ing with great respect the judgments of the state courts upon what
133. Clark, 198 U.S. at 367-68.
134. 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
135. Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531.
136. 208 U.S. 598 (1908).
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should be deemed public uses in that state."'137 But, the Court
continued:
We must not be understood as saying that cases may not arise
where this court would decline to follow the state courts in
their determination of the uses for which land could be taken
by the right of eminent domain. The cases cited, however,
show how greatly we have deferred to the opinions of the state
courts on this subject, which so closely concerns the welfare of
their people. We have found nothing in the Federal Constitu-
tion which prevents the condemnation by one person for his
individual use of a right of way over the land of another for
the construction of an irrigation ditch; of a right of way over
the land of another for an aerial bucket line; or of the right to
flow the land of another by the erection of a dam. It remains
for the future to disclose what cases, if any, of taking for uses
which the state Constitution, law, and court approve will be
held to be forbidden by the 14th Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. 138
In Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate
Power Co., 139 the Court confronted a local law that permitted a
power company to condemn land water land and water rights in
order to produce and sell hydroelectric power. The Court again
stressed the influence of local officials while making its own de-
termination:
The principal argument presented that is open here, is that
the purpose of the condemnation is not a public one. The
purpose of the Power Company's incorporation, and that for
which it seeks to condemn property of the plaintiff in error, is
to manufacture, supply, and sell to the public, power produced
by water as a motive force. In the organic relations of modern
society it may sometimes be hard to draw the line that is sup-
posed to limit the authority of the legislature to exercise or
delegate the power of eminent domain. But to gather the
streams from waste and to draw from them energy, labor
without brains, and so to save mankind from toil that it can
be spared, is to supply what, next to intellect, is the very
foundation of all our achievements and all our welfare. If that
137. Hairston, 208 U.S. at 607.
138. Id.
139. 240 U.S. 30 (1916).
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purpose is not public, we should be at a loss to say what is.
The inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal
test is established. The respect due to the judgment of the
state would have great weight if there were a doubt. But
there is none.1
40
As the Lochner era wore on and eventually ended, the rhetoric
of public use cases shifted, stating more frankly why the Court
would not interfere with legislative decisions. In United States ex
rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 141 the Court explained
that "[a]ny departure from this judicial restraint would result in
courts deciding on what is and is not a governmental function and
in their invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that
question at the moment of decision, a practice which has proved
impracticable in other fields."'142  The Court cited Case v.
Bowles, 143 a decision rejecting an argument that, in interpreting
the scope of Congress's war power where it intruded on state pow-
ers, a relevant consideration was "whether these [state powers]
were 'essential' to the state government."' 44 Welch also relied on
New York v. United States, 145 which presented the question of how
the Court should determine when states, as economic actors,
should be immune from federal taxation. There, the Court stated
that:
The science of government is the most abstruse of all sciences;
if, indeed that can be called a science, which has but few fixed
principles, and practically consists in little more than the ex-
ercise of sound discretion, applied to the exigencies of the
state as they arise. It is the science of experiment. 1
46
D. Reconciling Lochner Public Use Cases
As has been shown, the Lochner Court rarely vindicated a chal-
lenge that a taking violated the public use clause. Although this
tendency seems intuitively at odds with other Lochner-era juris-
prudence, the Court's public use jurisprudence is reconcilable with
the Court's economic regulation cases. One key principle guiding
140. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry, 240 U.S. at 32 (citations omitted).
141. 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
142. Welch, 327 U.S. at 552 (citations omitted).
143. 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
144. Case, 327 U.S. at 101.
145. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
146. New York, 326 U.S. at 579-80 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 226 (1821)).
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the Lochner Court was that the common law offered a neutral
baseline from which the government should not depart. In the
case of the public use requirement, American common law evi-
denced a pronounced tendency to favor acts of eminent domain, to
find public uses liberally, and to permit diminution of property
rights in favor of a broadly defined public interest. Thus, govern-
ment takings did not threaten to deviate from a common law base-
line-if anything, they were consistent with it. Moreover, takings
did not resemble the kind of class legislation the Lochner Court
disfavored. Rarely could a taking be seen as favoring one political
class or faction over another. Finally, although the Court fre-
quently spoke of the desirability of deferring to local authorities, it
did so because the takings at issue were essentially local in nature
and motivated by local geographical and economic concerns. Indi-
vidual state takings laws rarely threatened the kind of wholesale,
national economic consequences that other economic regulations
did. Moreover, even in stating its commitment to deference, the
Court always maintained that its ultimate holding was based on
its own, independent review of the challenged taking. Thus,
Lochner-era deference really meant that the Court afforded "great
weight" to the opinions of local legislatures and courts, not that it
followed them blindly. In that sense, the major twentieth century
cases were a great deal more deferential than were Lochner-era
cases.
Still, just as Lochner-era cases tended to uphold takings, so do
modern decisions. They are the same but different. They are the
same because both Lochner-era and modern cases hew to common
law principles that allow the government great latitude in deter-
mining what is, or is not, a public use. But they are different in
the nature of deference they apply. Modern cases like Berman,
Midkiff, and Kelo speak in terms of the importance of avoiding
meddling with socioeconomic decisions-a direct reaction to the
perceived abuses of the Lochner era. In the modern cases, there is
a sense that it would be illegitimate for the Court to make a deci-
sion that properly belongs to the legislature. Lochner-era defer-
ence was different. It did not assume that the Court lacked le-
gitimacy in making public use decisions, only expertise. It main-
tained that it was making the final call, but acknowledged that
local decisions should be afforded great respect because local offi-




III. THE PROBLEM OF EMINENT DOMAIN
It is useful at this point to address a foundational question: why
does it matter if courts liberally allow the use of eminent domain,
given the fact that property cannot be taken without just compen-
sation? 147 In this section, I discuss the justifications for the emi-
nent domain power and explain why it must be subject to some
limits notwithstanding the compensation requirement.
A. An Essential Power of Government
No one doubts that government often needs to acquire land for
beneficial projects. To do so, it may, like any other entity, pur-
chase the land on the open market. 148 In fact, the government is
usually required by law to attempt to buy targeted property before
invoking its eminent domain power. 149 But, the government may
feel compelled to invoke the eminent domain power when it is at-
tempting to acquire property in a "thin market." A market is thin
when the particular property the government needs is "scarce,"
usually because it is the only suitable land for the project. 150 In
thin markets, the government may encounter what is called an
"assembly problem," which refers to the practical difficulties asso-
ciated with obtaining title to all of the property required for a pro-
ject.151 Assembly problems arise when the government must ac-
quire a very specific set of parcels because, for example, it is build-
ing a highway that must traverse a particular path.152 Assembly
problems also arise when a lot of land is required in the specific
area identified for the project. 1
53
Thin markets are a challenge for the government because they
provide prime opportunities for "holdouts."'154 A holdout may be
147. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1113 (5th ed. 2002); James E.
Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 865 (2004).
148. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 934, 964 (2003) (describing government's options in acquiring property).
149. Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473,
473 (1978).
150. See Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 74-76
(1986-87) (describing market dynamics affecting eminent domain); Lee Anne Fennell, Tak-
ing Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 971-72 (2004) (describing "thin"
and "thick" markets).
151. See Merrill, supra note 150, at 75.
152. See id. at 74-76.
153. See William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Fed-
eral Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 929, 931
(2004).
154. See Fennell, supra note 150, at 971.
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sincerely-motivated-she may simply not wish to sell for a variety
of subjective reasons, or because the government's pre-
condemnation offer is less than what the property is worth to
her 155-- or she may wish to capitalize on her monopolistic posi-
tion. 156 A monopoly exists when sellers are able, in Thomas
Merrill's words, to "seek economic rents, that is, to charge a price
higher than the property's opportunity cost."'157 Erroll Meidinger
describes the "holdout problem" this way:
Stated in lay terms it is the possibility that an owner of prop-
erty necessary to the completion of a substantial project either
will refuse to sell and thus entirely thwart the project's possi-
ble benefits, or will hold out for an exorbitant price and
thereby "blackmail" society for a higher than fair price. In
economic terms the problem is defined as a seller holding out
for a higher price from a buyer known to be "assembling"
properties for a particular configuration (e.g., a railroad right-
of-way) than the seller would ask from a buyer not suspected
of planning such an assembly. Where hold-out behavior oc-
curs, fewer projects requiring assembly will be carried out
than if sellers sold at their true-"atomistic"-prices, and the
net production available to society will be lower than if goods
were compared, bought and sold at their true opportunity
costs. Production is thus expected to be sub- or at least
nonoptimal. 158
Eminent domain solves the problem of holdouts clearing the way
for beneficial projects that might otherwise be derailed. 159
B. The Importance of Limiting Eminent Domain
But, there are moral as well as efficiency concerns associated
with the use of eminent domain. Condemnation "is effectively a
155. See Fischel, supra note 153, at 931 (discussing people who "do not wish to sell be-
cause they have personal attachments to the land that cannot be assuaged by mere dol-
lars").
156. See Fennell, supra note 150, at 971-72 (discussing strategic holdouts); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 49 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing monopoly).
157. See Merrill, supra note 150, at 76. Opportunity cost is the "the benefit forgone by
employing a resource in a way that denies its use to someone else." POSNER, supra note
156, at 6.
158. Meidinger, supra note 101, at 49. See also Munch, supra note 149, at 476 n.7 (de-
fining "atomistic reservation price" as "the reservation price of a seller to a buyer whom he
did not suspect of planning an assembly").
159. See Merrill, supra note 150, at 82.
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reassignment of property rights: the seller is deprived of his right
to refuse to sell and constrained in his right to bargain over
price."'160 This inherently coercive nature-necessary for eminent
domain to provide any social utility at all-is also the source of
potential injustice. When the unfairness of eminent domain is
addressed at all, it is typically explained away by reference to the
"just compensation" requirement. 161 But the compensation re-
quired by eminent domain case law is widely seen as undercom-
pensatory.162 The former owner of condemned property is consti-
tutionally entitled to be paid "fair market value," which the Su-
preme Court has defined as "what a willing buyer would pay in
cash to a willing seller at the time of the taking."'163 But one needs
only the simplest understanding of economics to see the problem
here. Owners of targeted property are not willing to sell-at least
not at "fair market value"-or they would already have sold. 164
This unwillingness may be due to a variety of factors, including
sentimental reasons or a desire to hold onto the property in the
hope of realizing long-term economic gains. 165
Legal scholars have identified several types of "value" that are
excluded from "fair market value."'166 One is the so-called "subjec-
tive premium," also known as "consumer surplus," which consists
of the difference between the value an owner places on his prop-
erty and what the market is willing to pay for it.167 Commonly
recognized elements of the subjective premium include sentimen-
tal value, special suitability of the property to the owner, commu-
nity and personal ties, and avoidance of relocation costs (economic
and otherwise). 168 Although few people would doubt that these
elements may be of legitimate value to an owner and would ex-
plain an owner's unwillingness to sell at market price, the Su-
preme Court has specifically excluded the subjective premium
160. Munch, supra note 149, at 474.
161. James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Do-
main, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1984-85).
162. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 537 & n.314.
163. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, Etc., 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (quoting
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)).
164. See Fennell, supra note 150, at 963 ("Most property owners value their property
above fair market value ... ').
165. See id. at 966 (discussing property owner's desire to "hold onto the property in the
hopes that some later transaction will generate even more surplus for her).
166. See id. at 962 (employing the term "uncompensated increment').
167. See id. at 963-64; Merrill, supra note 150, at 83; Cohen, supra note 4, at 538-39.
168. See Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46
S.C. L. REV. 579, 582-83 (1995); Durham, supra note 161, at 1305; Fennell, supra note 150,
at 963-64; Merrill, supra note 150, at 83.
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from the constitutionally required just compensation. 169  The
Court justified this exclusion based on the "serious practical diffi-
culties in assessing the worth an individual places on particular
property at a given time."17
0
Another type of value routinely excluded from "just compensa-
tion" is a share of the increased value resulting from the transfer
of the property to a new owner. 171 This so-called "surplus from
transfer" may occur when a single property is added to a larger
parcel for the government's project, with the result that the value
of each component of the parcel increases. 172 Yet the constitution-
ally required "fair market value" makes no provision for transfer
surplus. 17 3 As a result, all of the surplus ends up in the hands of
the condemnor. 174 Put more concretely, a property owner faced
with the coercive power of eminent domain is denied what she
might otherwise enjoy in an open-market transaction: the chance
to negotiate a higher price because she is selling to someone with
a higher valuation. 175
Even though the exercise of eminent domain essentially confis-
cates significant value elements from owners of condemned prop-
erty, 176 some theorists seek to justify this confiscation on the basis
169. See 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S. 506.
170. See id. at 511.
171. See Fennell, supra note 150, at 965.
172. See id. at 965-66; Krier & Serkin, supra note 147, at 870 ("Assembling property
should create a surplus, because the value of each individual parcel is likely less than its
value as part of a larger whole put together by the government."); Garnett, supra note 148,
at 948 (stating "[an exercise of eminent domain almost always raises the value of the prop-
erty").
173. See, e.g., Miller, 317 U.S. at 377 (stating that property's "special value to the con-
demnor as distinguished from others who may or may not possess the power to condemn,
must be excluded as an element of market value"); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246,
255-256 (1934) (stating that compensation "is the market value of the property at the time
of the taking" and does not include "any element resulting subsequently to or because of the
taking").
174. See Merrill, supra note 150, at 85.
175. See Fennell, supra note 150, at 966. Merrill observes that in many cases, the prop-
erty owner should not be "entitled" to the transfer surplus because "[tihe active agent, the
supplier of the idea and the initiative is the condemnor... [A]s between a condemnor and a
condemnee, the condemnor is typically more responsible for, and hence arguably deserving
of, the surplus generated by the project." Merrill, supra note 150, at 86. How one resolves
this question of entitlement depends on one's assumptions about the inherent rights of
property ownership. Owning property is speculative. Ordinarily, a property owner is enti-
tled to realize increased value resulting from the behavior of other market participants, in
much the same way that she is generally not protected from erosion in value resulting from
local market conditions. Accord Fennell, supra note 150, at 991 (stating "perhaps one valu-
able attribute of property is its potential to be in high demand by someone else and to at
some point generate a shareable surplus").
176. See Fennell, supra note 150, at 962; see also Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman
Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988), cited in Fennell, supra, at 958 n.6.
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of "average reciprocity of advantage."'17 This term, used most fa-
mously by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,178 re-
fers to the possibility that imposing a concentrated burden on in-
dividual property owners may not be unjust if those owners also
somehow benefit indirectly from the taking. 179 Reciprocity may
occur in two ways. A property owner whose property has been
condemned may derive some benefit from the particular govern-
ment project at issue. 180 Or, he might benefit from the overall
scheme of eminent domain, even if he doesn't benefit from the par-
ticular project at issue, if the scheme generally applied increases
societal wealth. 181
The problem with the reciprocity of advantage theory, particu-
larly as applied to private-private takings, is that it only works as
justification if the project for which property is taken, or the over-
all eminent domain regime, actually produces benefits that can
either be enjoyed by the condemnee or enhance overall wealth.
With private-private takings, there is a grave risk that no recip-
rocity of advantage will result.
There are several reasons for this. As James Krier and Christo-
pher Serkin note, a condemnee may not partake of any benefits
generated by a particular project if, as a result of being dispos-
sessed of his property, he must relocate out of the region the pro-
ject is supposed to benefit. Moreover, even if he were to remain
situated so as to be able to enjoy any benefits that might be gener-
ated, there is always a risk that there will be few or no public
benefits.' 8 2 Because courts are generally so deferential to gov-
ernment's public use determinations-refusing, for example, to
consider whether projected benefits are likely to materialize l 83-
there is a significant risk that any gain resulting from an eco-
nomic development project, if it results at all, will be "merely inci-
dental" to benefits enjoyed primarily and exclusively by the pri-
vate interest involved. 8 4 The risk that predicted benefits for the
public will never occur is greater when taken property is trans-
177. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REv. 741, 769
(1999).
178. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
179. See Dagan, supra note 177, at 744.
180. Id. at 769.
181. Id.
182. See Krier & Serkin, supra note 147, at 867.
183. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487-88 (2005) (rejecting requirement
that expected benefits of a project are reasonably likely to occur).
184. See Krier & Serkin, supra note 147, at 863.
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ferred to a private entity than when the government takes and
retains title itself.18 5 As James Krier and Christopher Serkin ob-
serve, some public benefit is more certain "in the case of classic
public uses, precisely because the benefits so clearly accrue to the
public at large (and not to private interests for their own sake) in
such forms as access and services."'
18 6
As I stated earlier, even if the particular project for which prop-
erty is taken produces no benefit for the aggrieved property owner,
there may still be reciprocity of advantage if general eminent do-
main practices increase wealth for society as a whole. Here, too,
such a result is highly suspect. Because of the undercompensa-
tory nature of "just compensation," there is a serious risk that
government's use of the eminent domain power will actually de-
stroy more wealth than it produces. Because government doesn't
have to pay the full value of property it takes, it may proceed un-
der a "fiscal illusion" that undervalues property. 8 7 Local planners
balancing the cost of eminent domain against the projected gain
from a project are likely to disregard those value increments that
are not compensated. 88 Since they can ignore the subjective
value of property, local officials may approve or implement plans
which produce much less value for society than existed in the
hands of owners of property taken for the plan. 189 Because subjec-
tive value exists only in the hands of the transferring property
owner, 190 it evaporates when the property changes hands. 191
Planners who are free to disregard subjective value in determining
the cost of their project may actually cause a net decline in social
wealth. 192 Perhaps most important, the practice of assigning all
transfer surplus to the transferee creates the danger of manipula-
tion of the political process for the gain of politically powerful spe-
cial interests.
185. See id. at 867.
186. See id. at 866.
187. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 621 ("Fiscal illusion arises because the costs of governmental
actions are generally discounted by the decision-making body unless they explicitly appear
as a budgetary expense.").
188. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 705.
189. Fennell, supra note 150, at 964; Merrill, supra note 150, at 83.
190. See Fennell, supra note 150, at 964.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 964-65.
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IV. PUBLIC USE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING
In this section, I discuss ways in which the Supreme Court's
modern approach to the public use question reflects a larger prob-
lem in Constitutional decision-making: how best to formulate
rules when the text is vague or subject to multiple interpretations.
The Court's broad deference reflects what Lawrence Gene Sager
would call underenforcement. 193 But the fact that a substantive
provision of the constitution is not fully enforced by the Supreme
Court's rules does not mean that that provision cannot be more
broadly enforced by other means, perhaps, in the case of the public
use clause, by a cleaner, more representative decision-making
process.
A. Constitutional Underenforcement
Ill-defined or controversial Constitutional norms like the "public
use" requirement exemplify a recurring problem in the enforce-
ment of Constitutional ideals: the difficulty of translating an un-
derlying constitutional principle into an applicable rule of law that
can be relied upon to vindicate that principle. 194 There is, accord-
ing to Lawrence Gene Sager, "an important distinction between a
statement which describes an ideal which is embodied in the Con-
stitution and a statement which attempts to translate such an
ideal into a workable standard for the decision of concrete is-
sues." 195 This difficulty has placed the Supreme Court-and, by
extension, other federal courts-in a quandary, producing "situa-
tions in which the Court, because of institutional concerns, has
failed to enforce a provision of the Constitution to its full concep-
tual boundaries." 196 Thus, without rejecting the meaning or his-
torical understanding of a constitutional value, a court might
nonetheless promulgate a rule of law or judicial construct that
falls short of "exhausting" the full scope of a constitutional protec-
tion. 197
Sager cites as one example modern equal protection jurispru-
dence as it relates to economic regulation.198 A claim that a given
193. See Lawrence Gene Sager, The Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced




197. Id. at 1213-14.
198. Sager, supra note 193, at 1215-18.
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economic regulation rests upon an unfair classification will elicit
no more than "rational basis" review, and the challenged regula-
tion will be upheld if a court finds (as it almost always will) that
the law is "rationally related to a legitimate government pur-
pose." 199 The test is so deferential to the legislative process that a
challenged law will be upheld if it could be rationally interpreted
as advancing any conceivable legitimate public purpose, even if
there is nothing other than judicial speculation to suggest that the
government was, in fact, attempting to advance that purpose in
enacting the law. 200 Moreover, the question whether the legisla-
ture has, in fact, chosen a rational means to accomplish a public
purpose is subject to "the most relaxed and tolerant form of judi-
cial scrutiny." 20 1 As a result, a claim that the government has cre-
ated illegitimate classifications in enacting socioeconomic legisla-
tion is virtually certain to be denied judicial relief. 20 2 Similar re-
sults obtain when economic regulations are challenged under the
due process clause. 20 3 Such laws will be upheld if found to be "ra-
tionally related to serve a legitimate government purpose. 204
The broad deference afforded legislative enactments under ra-
tional basis review, whether in the context of equal protection or
due process, is justified on the grounds of three well-known "insti-
tutional concerns." First, it is argued that adjusting socio-
economic policy depends upon subjective value judgments that are
properly the province of democratically-elected legislatures, and
not of unelected judges. 205 In the words of Justice Hugo Black:
"[u]nder the system of government created by our Constitution, it
is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and util-
ity of legislation."20 6 Thus, the government is generally given free
rein under the federal constitution in enacting socioeconomic legis-
lation.20 7 Second, courts are said to lack the institutional compe-
tence to interpret and apply the kind of information-such as em-
pirical data, knowledge of local conditions, and other exigencies-
that necessarily shapes legislative decisions. 208 Third, as Richard
199. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331 (1981).
200. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
201. Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989).
202. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 678 (3d
ed. 2006).
203. Id. at 625.
204. Id.
205. See Sager, supra note 193, at 1217.
206. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
207. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 729.
208. See Sager, supra note 193, at 1217.
408 Vol. 46
The Abstruse Science
H. Fallon, Jr. has observed, "[m]any constitutional questions lack
answers that can be proved correct by straightforward chains of
rationally irresistible arguments." 209 Allowing the federal courts
to independently review regulatory classifications would produce
confused and irreconcilable results.210 Confronted with such ques-
tions, the Supreme Court is frequently inclined to prescribe judi-
cial deference. 211 The ultimate result, according to Sager, is that
"only a small part of the universe of plausible claims of unequal
and unjust treatment by government is seriously considered by
the federal courts; the vast majority of such claims are dismissed
out of hand."
212
Sager goes on to set forth indicators that a particular Constitu-
tional norm may be underenforced, including "a disparity between
the scope of a federal judicial construct and that of plausible un-
derstandings of the constitutional concept from which it derives..
. [and] the presence in court opinions of frankly institutional ex-
planations for setting particular limits to a federal judicial con-
struct."21 3 He believes the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is a
"likely candidate[] for characterization as underenforced. '' 214 And,
he argues, when a constitutional norm is underenforced, the un-
derlying principle is nonetheless valid. 21 5 The constitutional rule
has been adopted for reasons other than a determination of the
full scope of protection actually embodied in the constitution. 216
He explains:
The unenforced margins of underenforced norms should have
the full status of positive law which we generally accord to the
norms of our Constitution, save only that the federal judiciary
will not enforce these margins. Thus, the legal powers or le-
gal obligations of government officials which are subtended in
the unenforced margins of underenforced constitutional
norms are to be understood to remain in full force. 21 7
209. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreward: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV.
56, 57-58 (1997).
210. See Sager, supra note 193, at 1213.
211. See Fallon, supra note 209, at 57-58.
212. Sager, supra note 193, at 1216.
213. Id. at 1218-19.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1221.
216. See id.
217. Sager, supra note 193, at 1221.
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B. Constitutional Theory and Public Use
The observations of Sager and Fallon go part way toward pro-
viding at least some theoretical explanation for the Court's frus-
trating and seemingly contradictory approach to the public use
question. On the one hand, the Court has frequently stated that
the question whether a taking is for a public use is a judicial one
and that purely private takings are forbidden. Thus, the Court
has suggested, there is a constitutional norm to be vindicated in
the public use requirement. Yet, the court has fashioned a mod-
ern doctrine which, at least until Kelo, seemed completely ineffec-
tual at identifying and preventing the types of condemnations for-
bidden by that norm. Put another way, the public use require-
ment has not been, as some observers contend, "written out of the
Constitution." It is merely underenforced by federal courts be-
cause of the Supreme Court's well-entrenched reluctance to evalu-
ate socioeconomic legislation and the difficulty of formulating a
workable public use test.
Indeed, the Court acknowledged some of the institutional con-
siderations underlying its public use jurisprudence in Kelo. In
addition to reiterating its concerns regarding the propriety of
evaluating socioeconomic legislation, the Court elaborated on its
historical inability to fashion a workable public use test. Justice
Stevens even went so far as to invite fuller enforcement of the
public use requirement in his remarkable acknowledgement that
state courts and legislatures were free to adopt a more rigorous
approach than adopted by the Court's decision. 218 In a sense, he
was inviting the political process to enforce the public use clause
more fully than the Court has been able to. Indeed, since Kelo was
decided, most of the states have, by judicial decision or legislation,
tightened their rules for use of the eminent domain power.219
The suggestion that a "comprehensive development plan" might
help distinguish permissible from impermissible takings embodies
an invitation to fully enforce the public use clause. A thorough
and open planning process characterized by careful studies and
adherence to applicable statutes could, in theory, allow for better
protection of property rights. It could also produce an end result
218. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
219. For a comprehensive discussion of post-Kelo reforms at the state level, see Timothy
Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Re-
form?, SM040 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 587 (2007).
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reflective of the citizenry's conception of the protections embodied
in the public use clause.
V. WHAT PROCESS SCRUTINY MIGHT MEAN
Where the government seeks to condemn property for a use that
will provide significant benefits to a private party, whether or not
the property is also transferred to the private party, process con-
cerns abound. Donald Kochan has written that
[a] public use is now whatever the legislature says is public.
Legislators can sell the eminent domain power to special in-
terests for almost any use, promising durability in the deal
given the low probability that the judiciary will invalidate it
on the grounds that the condemnation is private in nature.
220
Commenting on the specific instance of "economic development"
takings, Ilya Somin has explained that such condemnations
allow politically powerful interest groups to "capture" the con-
demnation process for the purpose of enriching themselves at
the expense of the poor and politically weak. While economic
development takings are not the only type of condemnation
subject to this kind of abuse, they are especially vulnerable to
it because "economic development" can justify almost any
condemnation that transfers property to a commercial enter-
prise. 2
21
The Kelo Court's "comprehensive plan" test goes some way, at
least, toward reducing the risk of eminent domain abuse. The test
suggests that a "pretexual taking" exists if a court, plumbing the
record, concludes that the process by which a decision to invoke
the eminent domain power was reached bears the stench of proce-
dural irregularities or indicia of improper influence. In other
words, for the first time, the Supreme Court has hinted that the
inquiry is not to be focused on the proposed end use of a property,
but whether the political process has fallen victim to the very
dangers that the Fifth Amendment public use clause was intended
to prevent.
220. Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 52 (1998).
221. Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Devel-
opment Takings and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1008 (2004).
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A. Process Scrutiny in the State Courts
Scrutiny of the process as opposed to the result, while not com-
mon, is not unprecedented in the state courts. In Southwestern
Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental
(SWIDA),222 the Supreme Court of Illinois considered whether a
regional development authority had violated the state's public use
clause by using the power of eminent domain to take private prop-
erty in order to transfer it to a privately owned racetrack, for the
expansion of its parking facilities. 223 The court acknowledged that
the proposed use of the land to be taken might indirectly benefit
the public by generating additional revenue for the racetrack,
which "could potentially trickle down and bring corresponding
revenue increases to the region. ' 224 The court also stopped short
of rejecting the development authority's contention that expanded
parking would enhance public safety by reducing traffic congestion
on nearby interstates and eliminating the need for some racetrack
spectators to cross a highway from existing parking areas. 225 Yet
the court held that the takings were not for a public use because
"members of the public are not the primary intended beneficiaries
of this taking."226 Pointing to the process by which the develop-
ment authority had decided to use its condemnation power, the
court concluded that the authority was merely acting at the bid-
ding of private economic interests. The court explained:
While the activities here were undertaken in the guise of car-
rying out its legislated mission, SWIDA's true intentions were
not clothed in an independent, legitimate governmental deci-
sion to further a planned public use. SWIDA did not conduct
or commission a thorough study of the parking situation at
Gateway. Nor did it formulate any economic plan requiring
additional parking at the racetrack. SWIDA advertised that,
for a fee, it would condemn land at the request of "private de-
velopers" for the "private use" of developers. In addition,
SWIDA entered into a contract with Gateway to condemn
whatever land "may be desired by Gateway." Clearly, the
foundation of this taking is rooted not in the economic and
planning process with which SWIDA has been charged.
222. 768 N.E.2d 1 (111. 2002).
223. SWIDA, 768 N.E.2d at 3-4.
224. Id. at 10.
225. Id. at 9, 5-6.
226. Id. at 10.
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Rather, this action was undertaken solely in response to
Gateway's expansion goals and its failure to accomplish those
goals through purchasing NCE's land at an acceptable negoti-
ated price. It appears SWIDA's true intentions were to act as
a default broker of land for Gateway's proposed parking
plan. 227
Similarly, in 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment
Agency, 228 the court concluded that a development authority's
process demonstrated that it was motivated primarily by fear that
a large retailer would relocate out of the development district if
land was not condemned for the retailer's use. 229 There, the rede-
velopment agency, under the auspices of a regional revitalization
plan, threatened to condemn a leasehold interest in shopping cen-
ter space occupied by plaintiff 99 Cents Only Stores in order to
transfer the space to Costco Wholesale. 230 Costco had explicitly
warned that it might move to a nearby community unless permit-
ted to take over the space occupied by 99 Cents. 231 The redevel-
opment agency relied on a fifteen-year-old determination that the
targeted property was blighted, even though since the original
blight determination had been made, the property had been devel-
oped and the state legislature had amended the definition of
blight. 232 The original delegation of the power of eminent domain
to the redevelopment agency had been for the purpose of condemn-
ing blighted property. 233
In enjoining the redevelopment agency from initiating eminent
domain proceedings, the court stated:
In this case, the evidence is clear beyond dispute that Lancas-
ter's condemnation efforts rest on nothing more than the de-
sire to achieve the naked transfer of property from one private
party to another. Indeed, Lancaster itself admits that the
only reason it enacted the Resolutions of Necessity [a proce-
dural step authorizing the use of eminent domain] was to sat-
isfy the private expansion demands of Costco. It is equally
undisputed that Costco could have easily expanded within the
227. Id.
228. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001), dismissed as moot, 60 Fed. App'x 123 (9th
Cir. 2003).




233. Id. at 1125, 1127.
Spring 2008 413
Duquesne Law Review
[shopping center] without displacing 99 Cents at all but re-
fused to do so. Finally, by Lancaster's own admissions, it was
willing to go to any lengths-even so far as condemning com-
mercially viable, unblighted real property-simply to keep
Costco within the city's boundaries. In short, the very reason
that Lancaster decided to condemn 99 Cents' leasehold inter-
est was to appease Costco. Such conduct amounts to an un-
constitutional taking for purely private purposes. 234
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Baycol, Inc. v. City
of Fort Lauderdale,2 5 overturned the trial court's approval of a
taking of land for the purpose of constructing a parking garage
that would be leased to a private developer. 236 There, the court
took notice of trial court testimony by the executive director of the
condemning development authority suggesting that he was uncer-
tain of the purpose of the parking garage and his further testi-
mony that the construction of the garage would produce an excess
of parking capacity until private development occurred in the
area. 237 The court explained:
Thus it appears that without the private development there
would be no public need for the parking cited as the sole basis
for condemnation. This is a very dangerous precedent that
would allow a total departure from the basic requirement that
there must first be a showing of a public necessity or public
use, in order for eminent domain to be utilized against private
ownership as protected in our constitutions. 238
In Wilmington Parking Authority v. 227 West 8th St.,239 the Su-
preme Court of Delaware upheld the trial court's finding that a
taking of land for the construction of a parking garage was not for
a public purpose. 240 The plan called for transfer of the taken land
to the city's main newspaper, the Wilmington News-Journal,
which would then expand its existing facilities into 35 feet of sur-
face space underneath the elevated garage. 241 The trial court re-
cord indicated that the City of Wilmington had been attempting to
234. 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1129.
235. 315 So.2d 451, 458, 459 (Fla. 1975).
236. Baycol, 315 So.2d at 458, 459.
237. Id. at 458.
238. Id.
239. 521 A.2d 227 (Del. 1987).
240. Wilmington, 521 A.2d at 234.
241. Id. at 227.
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accommodate the News-Journal's expansion desires within the
city for several years and feared it would exercise an option on
land outside the city. 242 The Supreme Court pointed to evidence
in the record that the city's liaison to the parking authority had
written to the News-Journal "on behalf of the WPA" promising to
"accommodate all your needs. ' 243 The court further noted that at
the same time the parking authority was seeking to condemn the
land at issue, it was eliminating 500 public parking spaces in the
area. 244 The court explained that "a reviewing court should not
unduly limit its inquiry in determining whether the primary pur-
pose of a proposed project falls within an agency's statutory au-
thority"-in this case, acquisition of land for public parking-and
could consider evidence that a taking was driven by motivations
outside the agency's mandate. 245 Thus, it was proper for the trial
court to consider the process undertaken by the parking authority
in selecting property for condemnation as well as communications
and other evidence suggesting that the process may have been
influenced by the desire to benefit a private interest. 246 Even
though the trial court found that the project would produce some
public benefit-a net gain of 350 parking spaces-evidence of
process failure, coupled with the trial court's finding that the
News-Journal was the primary beneficiary of the project, sup-
ported a finding that the taking was not for a public use. 247
B. What Kelo May Mean for Future Public Use Cases
These cases suggest an important, and potentially radical, im-
plication underlying the Kelo decision: a proposed taking may be
struck down as lacking a justifying "public use" even if the project
for which the targeted land is intended will, or conceivably could,
produce a public benefit.248 Thus, the new test abandons the his-
torically vexing question whether a use can be considered "public,"
and whether such a use, if public, will in fact occur, in favor of an
inquiry into the adequacy of the process by which the decision to
take is reached.
242. Id. at 230.
243. Id. at 233.
244. Id.
245. Wilmington, 521 A.2d at 233.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 233-34.
248. See Garnett, supra note 4, at 457-58.
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Such a shift has several significant implications for eminent
domain law. First, it arguably dispenses with the requirement of
a public use entirely, instead requiring a kind of procedural due
process. Second, as a consequence of a new process-based stan-
dard, eminent domain law continues to potentially "underen-
force" 249 the constitutional requirement of a public use in cases
where a flawless process nonetheless produces a speculative, at-
tenuated, or non-existent public advantage. This danger is in-
creased by the possibility, suggested by Nicole Garnett, that plan-
ning will come to serve as a public use "safe harbor."250 Third, as
Garnett elaborates, it underscores and, to some extent, reconciles
an uneasy fit between rational basis review as it exists generally
in constitutional law and as it has existed in the context of "public
use" determinations.
This last implication-reconciliation between rational basis re-
view generally and as applied in the context of eminent domain-
adds an element of coherence to eminent domain law by poten-
tially eliminating two doctrinal inconsistencies. 251 Recall that un-
der rational basis review, a law is upheld if it advances any con-
ceivable legitimate public purpose, even if the reviewing court
must hypothesize a legitimate public purpose that could be ad-
vanced by the law. 25 2 In other words, the actual purpose behind
the government's action is irrelevant, as long as there could be a
legitimate purpose. 253 But, as Garnett notes, "conceivability re-
view" is not easily reconciled with actual eminent domain practice.
She notes that in most states, the government can not initiate a
judicial condemnation proceeding without pleading its justifying
public purpose. 254 Yet pre-Kelo eminent domain case law evi-
denced no requirement that a reviewing court consider the plausi-
bility of the government's stated justification, requiring instead a
simple finding that "the exercise of eminent domain power is ra-
tionally related to a conceivable public purpose." Garnett asks:
why consider whether a taking is rationally related to any con-
ceivable public purpose when the government is required to plead
an actual public purpose before it can condemn property? Else-
where in constitutional law, when the government asserts an im-
249. See Sager, supra note 193.
250. See Garnett, supra note 4, at 454.
251. See id. at 449-54.
252. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
253. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984) (citing United States
v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
254. See Garnett, supra note 4, at 451.
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plausible justification for its actions, a court may not uphold the
government's action by hypothesizing another justification. 
255
The improperly motivated taking test brings eminent domain
rational basis review into line with rational basis review in other
situations where the government actually asserts a justification
for its actions. The true purpose of the government's decision to
take is a key inquiry. Where the process suggests an improper
motive, a taking will be invalidated even if an actual public ad-
vantage seems clearly established. Extending to eminent domain
law the requirement that the government's stated motivation be
its actual motivation eliminates a logical anomaly unique to pre-
Kelo eminent domain law. 256
The second doctrinal inconsistency eliminated by a motivation-
based test involves the truism that "one person's property may not
be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justi-
fying public purpose, even though compensation be paid."257 De-
spite this supposed "bedrock principle,"258 the Court has stead-
fastly refused to consider whether a given taking will actually
produce the benefit the government claims it is attempting to
achieve. 259 Such refusal to consider whether the government's
chosen means for effectuating policy-the exercise of eminent do-
main-is likely to achieve the government's policy goals tolerates
a grave danger that the stated reason for condemnation is a pre-
text for an improperly motivated taking. 260 Reviewing the process
by which the government has decided to initiate condemnation
will in many cases require consideration of whether the govern-
ment actually evaluated the likelihood of success, considered al-
ternatives, and even commissioned independent studies. Indica-
tions that the government's actions are logically inconsistent with
its own findings--or that the government has failed to conduct a
serious inquiry into the need for, or consequences of, its planned
course of action-will, as Justice Stevens indicated in Kelo, "raise
a suspicion that a private purpose [is] is afoot." 261
255. See id.
256. Id. at 447, 451.
257. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55,
80 (1937)).
258. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
259. See, e.g., Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242 ("When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and
its means are not irrational ... empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than
debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried
out in the federal courts."), quoted in Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488.
260. See Garnett, supra note 4, at 453.
261. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487.
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This, of course, assumes that Kelo will be read to require an
evaluation of the quality of the planning process. To be sure, no-
where does the majority instruct reviewing courts to scrutinize
whether the outcome of a process flows logically or fairly from the
inputs considered by the process or whether the process demon-
strates an absence of "impermissible favoritism." It is conceivable
that under Kelo the mere existence of a planning process, without
more, serves as a proxy for fairness, even if the outcome of the
process is arguably illogical and unfair. It certainly seems possi-
ble that local officials could easily engineer what appears to be a
comprehensive plan derived from an open process, and still make
decisions that are, in fact, motivated by a desire to favor private
interests. There will always be cases where the inputs, testimony,
evidence, studies, and hearings could reasonably support more
than one course of action. If there were an objectively correct an-
swer to every planning problem, then the courts could engage in
less deferential review.
Clayton Gillette has argued that the existence of a plan will
necessarily imply the presence of certain factors which minimize,
without eliminating, some of the risks the public use requirement
is intended to control.262 For example, a comprehensive plan sug-
gests that numerous stakeholders with conflicting interests will
participate in an open process. 263 This, he contends, reduces the
risk that a small but powerful group will be able to hijack the po-
litical process for its own gain.264 In addition, he suggests that a
plan, by definition, suggests a project of sufficient magnitude to
impact a significant number of potential condemnees. 265 Although
the affected landowners may constitute a minority of all residents
within the jurisdiction, they will have more at stake than most of
their fellow citizens and therefore "sufficient incentive to become
involved that even moderate numbers of them can swamp the po-
litical process by which a final decision is made."266 Thus, the
"comprehensive plan" rule insures an opportunity for open dissent
and conditions under which affected landowners will have a fair
chance of being heard, even if not heeded. 267 Gillette does not
read the Kelo decision as implying that reviewing courts must






267. Gillette, supra note 262, at 18.
418 Vol. 46
The Abstruse Science
consider whether the process was fair or produced a tainted result.
Nor does he believe that the Kelo Court expected that comprehen-
sive plans would eradicate the risk of political capture or self-
interested behavior by policy-makers. He argues that
the capacity of the judiciary to make inquiries into the proc-
ess, to reverse engineer the political decision to determine
whether it was tainted or whether the same decision would
have been reached on objective grounds, is minimal. Thus,
perhaps the best that a court can do is to define the conditions
under which the probability of abuse is minimal and defer to
the political process when those criteria are satisfied. 268
VI. CONCLUSION
The public use question presents some of the most challenging
and controversial questions concerning constitutional protections
of property rights. After many decades of prescribing almost com-
plete judicial deference to the elected decision-makers on the issue
of what constitutes a public use, the Supreme Court in Kelo finally
provided at least one guidepost. The existence of a "comprehen-
sive development plan," according to the Court, may be a strong
indication that an economic development taking is actually for a
"public use." The Court's shift in some senses improves the state
of public use law. Having relegated the public use decision to the
political process, the Court has now provided one means for de-
termining if the political process is working fairly. But the new
approach remains highly deferential. Ironically, although modern
judicial deference on the public use question is a response to the
perceived abuses of the Lochner era, the contemporary approach
produces approximately the same results as were obtained in the
Lochner era. In the end, while Kelo represents an improvement
over earlier decisions, it is likely to provide little protection
against abuse of the eminent domain power.
268. Id. at 19.
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